

DEVELOPING A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR INSIDER THREAT

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DEFINITION OF AN INSIDER

An insider can be anyone working within a central government department or a commercial organisation that intentionally exploits or intends to exploit his/her legitimate access to an organisation's assets for unauthorised purposes.



EXAMPLES

- **≻**Theft
- ➤IP theft e.g., company secrets, money, data
- **≻**Fraud
- **Terrorism**
- Reputation damage
- **≻**Blackmail
- Denial of service attacks
- Introduction of viruses, worms
 Trojan horses
- Corruption or deletion of data
- ► Altering data
- Password cracking

HARM CAUSED BY INSIDER THREAT

Loss of monies

Reputational harm

Harm to employees

Harm to clients

Security to individuals/organisations/society

National Infrastructure

CHELSEA (BRADLEY) MANNING, JULIAN ASSANGE, EDWARD SNOWDEN

Whistleblower or insider threat?







DEMOGRAPHIC DETAILS

- ■Men 20-45 years
- □ Full-time permanent staff (88%, CPNI, 2013)
- □Customer facing (20%, CPNI, 2013)
- □Financial (11%, CPNI, 2013)
- □ Security staff (11%, CPNI, 2013)
- University graduates (58%, CPNI, 2013)

Job roles:

- Managerial (45%, CPNI, 2013)
- ■Non-managerial (49%, CPNI, 2013)

INSIDER THREAT, FRAUD

- \square Average insider = 30 years
- ☐ Age range 21-20 years.
- \square Men/Women = 60/40 split (akin to working population)



SHAW & STOCK (2011): IP THEFT

- \square Average age = 37 years
- ☐ Employed in technical positions
- ☐ 65 % who committed an insider attack had already accepted a new job





Difficult to detect on demographic details alone!

DISPOSITIONAL INDICATORS

- Self-centredness, arrogance, risk-taking, manipulative, coldness, narcissism, self-deception and defensiveness (Turner & Gelles, 2003).
- □ 120 cases: immature, low self-esteem, amoral and unethical, superficial, prone to fantasising, restless and impulsive, lacks conscientiousness, manipulate, emotionally unstable, evidence of psychological or personality disorders (CPNI, 2013).
- □IP theft: antisocial traits, difficulties getting along with others, being above the rules, impulsivity, tendency to blame others, ambitious, and greedy (Shaw & Stock, 2011).





IP theft: Volume of printing (Malood & Stephens, 2007).



Emotional state, such as depressed, stressed (e.g., Shaw & Stock, 2011; Turner & Gelles, 2003).



Hypothetical situations – language change + negative affect (Taylor et al., 2013)



Difficult to pick up alone!

BEHAVIOURAL INDICATORS

- 1. Examine which psychological, behavioural, and social variables (in both the physical and cyber realms) are important when identifying potential insider attackers.
- 2. Examine the potential pathways that might lead to an attack.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

METHOD

Case study methodology – 99 collected

Attack took place within the year prior to the interviews taking place

Semi-structured interview with – managers, fellow employees, HR personnel, heads of security and their teams, law enforcement officers.

Interviewed about: the job role of the insider; their general behaviour in the workplace, prior to and after the attack; their observations regarding the person's personality and behaviour; the person's circumstances prior to and after the attack (both at organisation they conducted the attack as well as previous employment); information about the person outside of the workplace (e.g., socially, networks); their understanding of the person's motivation for the attack; details about how the insider went about the attack; and how the attack was detected.

- ☐ Financial sector
- Retail sector
- Public sector
- ☐ Telecommunications providers
- ☐ High school
- Labourer business
- □Insurance provider
- □ Courier business
- Nursery
- Warehouse
- Prison









ORGANISATIONS

TYPE OF INSIDER ATTACK

- ☐ Fraud (80%)
- \square Reputational damage (7%)
- ☐Theft (7%)
- □IP/data theft (6%)
- □ Identity theft (3%)
- ☐ Money laundering (2%)
- □ Procurement fraud (2%)
- ☐Working illegally (1%)
- □ 10% of cases involved more than one type of insider attack



INSIDERS


In most cases there was a person working in isolation (68%); however, 32% of the cases involved a group (some of which included outsiders).

In 50% of the cases the insider received a custodial sentence, 13% received a community service order and 15% received a suspended sentence.

Eighty-eight per cent of the insiders where dismissed and 3% resigned.

Sixty-two per cent of the insiders where male and 38% were female, with ages ranging from 19-62 years (M=31.39 years).

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titlement and seeks admiration, attention, prestige and	10
, charming and highly ambitious person.	11
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DESCRIPTON OF INSIDER


External locus of control	Fatalist view of the world, believing that events that happen are out	2
	of their control.	
Open to flattery	Open to flattery and being coerced by others (e.g., conned into a	2
	romantic relationship).	
Life circumstances and actions		
prior to employment		
Gang membership	Socialising with or known member of a gang.	9
Criminal record	Previous criminal record — either related or unrelated to current role.	6
Working illegally in the country	Working illegally (e.g., limited or no work visa).	3
Presented forged documentation	When applying/accepting the job the candidate presented forged	2
to HR	documentation (e.g., birth certificate; education transcripts).	

Behaviours displayed at work prior to the attack		
Strong work affiliation	Hard workers that appeared happy with their jobs and organisation.	56
Weak work affiliation	Lazy or unmotivated workers that often appeared unhappy with their role and organisation.	44
Aggressive	Physically and/or verbally aggressive to others (in or out of the workplace). Online and offline.	11
Misconduct	Prior to the attack, the insider had been in trouble for misconduct at work (e.g., disciplinary suspension; security breaches).	8

Emotions displayed during and		
leading up to the attack		
Stressed; anxious; depressed	These individuals were described as stressed, anxious and/or depressed.	20
	Many of the insiders were experiencing life stressors beyond the	
	workplace; although the stress could have caused from engaging in the	
	insider attack.	
Behaviours and life circumstances		
during the attack		
Addiction	Addiction problem, such as alcohol, drugs, shopping. During the attack –	16
	and typically leading up to the attack. Might have had this problem	
	prior to employment.	
Personal hardship	Money needed due to personal hardship (e.g., divorce; partner lost their	15
	job; sudden family illness/accident).	

Coercion/blackmail from others	An outside gang coerced the individual and/or	13
	threatened/blackmailed them into conducting the crime.	
Increased time logged into secure	Employee spends greater amounts of time (than they normally would and	9
areas	for no apparent reason) in secure areas (e.g., viewing/editing customer	
	accounts).	
Showing off newly acquired	Showing off newly acquired wealth without any explanation for the	8
wealth	change in financial circumstances – appears to be living beyond their	
	means.	
Change in attitude towards	Change observed by those in the workplace from being highly motivated	7
workplace	to low motivated workers.	
Displays signs of disgruntlement	Shows signs of disgruntlement (e.g., due to missed out promotion;	7
	unhappy with the way they have been treated).	

Unusual hours	Turning up to work or leaving at times different to those required or expected and/or different compared with employees in similar roles. Taking longer breaks than permitted.	4
Downloading large volumes of data	Downloading large volumes of data and/or emailing large volumes of data	3
Star employee – not meeting targets	A talented, well-regarded employee ceases to meet targets and displays signs of distress.	3
Absentee	Frequently taking time off work.	3




MOTIVATION

Motivation	Description	%
Greed/Living beyond their means	Intense and selfish desire to acquire wealth. Need money to support	55
	their lifestyle and pay-off debts (not acquired from addiction).	
Need to support an addiction	Money needed to support addiction and/or pay-off insurmountable	16
	debt accrued from addition (e.g., alcohol, drug, shopping).	
Personal hardship	Money needed due to personal hardship (e.g., divorce; partner lost	15
	their job; sudden family illness/accident).	
Coercion/blackmail from others	An outside gang coerced the individual and/or	13
	threatened/blackmailed them into conducting the crime.	
Disgruntlement/revenge	Disgruntled employee – wanting to hurt the organisation/ seek out	7
	revenge	


Entitlement	Act was carried out due to a sense of entitlement (e.g., insider	6
	believed they were deprived of promotion/status within	
	organisation that they were entitled to; stealing IP because they had	
	contributed to the development of the product within the	
	organisation).	
Proof of cleverness	Wanted to prove to self and/or others their ability to commit the	5
	crime, undetected.	
Addicted to the crime itself	Appeared addicted to committing the crime –	3

sense of enjoyment from the act itself.



OPPOTUNITY

Opportunity	Description	%
Sought weakness in security	Sought out weakness in security (physical or cyber) in order to commit the crime;	45
	deliberately sought out to breach security.	
Exploit others/abused position of	Sought out ways to exploit/manipulate others in order to commit the crime;	38
authority	abused position of authority (e.g., vulnerable customers; recruit other insiders).	
Outsiders assistance	Outsiders helped the insider to commit the crime (one case involved a previous	21
	employee).	
Sought out from onset	Intended to commit the crime from the outset of employment. Set about seeking	18
	out an opportunity to commit the crime from the beginning of their employment.	
	Many of these insiders had previous convictions.	
Stumbled across weakness in security	Accidently stumbled across weakness in security (physical or cyber) that	5
	prompted them to consider committing the crime.	
Previous employment enabled the	Work conducted in the criminals' previous employment enabled the crime (e.g.,	3
crime	stolen identities from clients from previous job).	



DISCOVERY

Discovery	Description	%
Digital/video evidence	Digital or cyber evidence obtained after the attack – because suspicions had	61
	been raised.	
Monitoring physical/online initiated	Person was monitored more closely after complaints or suspicions (usually from	28
after the attack	someone outside of the organisation). The attack was then discovered in real-	
	time and evidence was found of previous attacks.	
Monitoring procedures — real time	Monitoring procedures detected the attack in real time (cyber and/or physical).	28
Customer complaints	Serious complaints by clients/customers about the employee or about problems	28
	with their accounts prompted an investigation.	
Suspicious behaviours reported	Suspicious behaviour/caught in the act reported by fellow employees prompted	19
	an investigation.	
Outside organisation	An outside organisation detected the attack – evidence was provided via these	9
	outside sources, which prompted an internal investigation.	

Closing down opportunities Improve prescreening methods Improve security measures, including surveillance, monitoring, workplace practices and policy Support staff (e.g., disgruntled, addicts, personal hardship) Improve workplace culture Improve reporting procedures - external and internal Monitoring and surveillance of outside threats Pre-screening characteristics Criminal record Problematic work history Addictions

Employee

Gang membership Working illegally Forged documents

Concerning behaviours
Personality traits
Weak work affiliation
Addictions
Gang membership
Aggression
Misconduct
Depression
Anxiety
Stress

Collecting data
Digital monitoring
Personal data from open sources
Workplace norms
Manager's observations and interviews
Fellow employee's observations
External reporting – clients, customers, etc.
Informed by scholarly research

Change in Behaviour/circumstance Addictions Personal hardship Coercion/blackmail Increased time logged into secure areas Showing off newly acquired wealth Change in attitude towards workplace - from high to low motivation Disgruntlement Usual hours Downloading large volumes of data Star employee not meeting targets Absentee Depression Anxiety Stress

REFERENCE

Whitty, M. T. (in press). Developing a conceptual model for insider threat. Journal of Management & Organization.